The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission
This paper develops a form of moral actualism that can explain the procreative asymmetry. Along the way, it defends and explains the attractive asymmetry: the claim that although an impermissible option can be self-conditionally permissible, a permissible option cannot be self-conditionally impermis...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer Netherlands,
2021-10-12T18:57:29Z.
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| Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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| 100 | 1 | 0 | |a Spencer, Jack |e author |
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a The procreative asymmetry and the impossibility of elusive permission |
| 260 | |b Springer Netherlands, |c 2021-10-12T18:57:29Z. | ||
| 856 | |z Get fulltext |u https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/132936 | ||
| 520 | |a This paper develops a form of moral actualism that can explain the procreative asymmetry. Along the way, it defends and explains the attractive asymmetry: the claim that although an impermissible option can be self-conditionally permissible, a permissible option cannot be self-conditionally impermissible. | ||
| 546 | |a en | ||
| 655 | 7 | |a Article | |
| 773 | |t Philosophical Studies | ||