Estimating dynamic games of oligopolistic competition: an experimental investigation
We evaluate standard assumptions in the estimation of dynamic oligopoly models with laboratory data. Using an entry/exit game, we estimate structural parameters under the assumption that the data are generated by a Markov-perfect equilibrium and subsequently predict counterfactual behavior. If behav...
Main Authors: | Salz, Tobias (Author), Vespa, Emanuel (Author) |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics (Contributor), Sloan School of Management (Contributor) |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Wiley,
2021-04-05T20:03:33Z.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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