Social explanation: Structures, stories, and ontology. A reply to díaz león, saul, and sterken

In response to commentaries by Esa Díaz León, Jennifer Saul, and Rachel Sterken, I develop more fully my views on the role of structure in social and metaphysical explanation. Although I believe that social agency, quite generally, occurs within practices and structures, the relevance of structure...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Haslanger, Sally (Author)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2021-03-17T14:58:57Z.
Subjects:
Online Access:Get fulltext
LEADER 01310 am a22001693u 4500
001 130157
042 |a dc 
100 1 0 |a Haslanger, Sally  |e author 
100 1 0 |a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy  |e contributor 
245 0 0 |a Social explanation: Structures, stories, and ontology. A reply to díaz león, saul, and sterken 
260 |b Walter de Gruyter GmbH,   |c 2021-03-17T14:58:57Z. 
856 |z Get fulltext  |u https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130157 
520 |a In response to commentaries by Esa Díaz León, Jennifer Saul, and Rachel Sterken, I develop more fully my views on the role of structure in social and metaphysical explanation. Although I believe that social agency, quite generally, occurs within practices and structures, the relevance of structure depends on the sort of questions we are asking and what interventions we are considering. The emphasis on questions is also relevant in considering metaphysical and meta-metaphysical issues about realism with respect to gender and race. I aim to demonstrate that tools we develop in the context of critical social theory can change the questions we ask, what forms of explanation are called for, and how we do philosophy. 
546 |a en 
655 7 |a Article 
773 |t 10.2478/disp-2018-0015 
773 |t Disputatio