Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable

Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable

This paper argues that evidential decision theory is incompatible with options having objective values. If options have objective values, then it should always be rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value. But, as w...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Spencer, Jack (Author)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Oxford University Press (OUP), 2021-03-17T13:55:01Z.
Subjects:
Article
Online Access:Get fulltext
LEADER 01052 am a22001693u 4500
001 130152
042 |a dc 
100 1 0 |a Spencer, Jack  |e author 
100 1 0 |a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy  |e contributor 
245 0 0 |a Objective Value Is Always Newcombizable 
260 |b Oxford University Press (OUP),   |c 2021-03-17T13:55:01Z. 
856 |z Get fulltext  |u https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/130152 
520 |a This paper argues that evidential decision theory is incompatible with options having objective values. If options have objective values, then it should always be rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value. But, as we show, if options have objective values and evidential decision theory is true, then it is not always rationally permissible for an agent to choose an option if they are certain that the option uniquely maximizes objective value. 
546 |a en 
655 7 |a Article 
773 |t 10.1093/MIND/FZZ070 
773 |t Mind 

Similar Items