Privacy-constrained network formation

We study the effects of privacy concerns on social network formation. Each individual decides which others to form links with. Links bring direct benefits from friendship but also lead to the sharing of information via a percolation process. Privacy concerns are modeled as a disutility that the indi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Acemoglu, K. Daron (Author), Makhdoumi Kakhaki, Ali (Author), Malekian, Azarakhsh (Author), Ozdaglar, Asuman E (Author)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics (Contributor), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier BV, 2020-06-09T14:04:51Z.
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Online Access:Get fulltext
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100 1 0 |a Acemoglu, K. Daron  |e author 
100 1 0 |a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics  |e contributor 
100 1 0 |a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science  |e contributor 
700 1 0 |a Makhdoumi Kakhaki, Ali  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Malekian, Azarakhsh  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Ozdaglar, Asuman E  |e author 
245 0 0 |a Privacy-constrained network formation 
260 |b Elsevier BV,   |c 2020-06-09T14:04:51Z. 
856 |z Get fulltext  |u https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/125736 
520 |a We study the effects of privacy concerns on social network formation. Each individual decides which others to form links with. Links bring direct benefits from friendship but also lead to the sharing of information via a percolation process. Privacy concerns are modeled as a disutility that the individual suffers as a result of her private information being acquired by others. We specify conditions under which pure-strategy equilibria exist and characterize both pure-strategy and mixed-strategy equilibria. The resulting equilibrium networks feature clustered connections and homophily. Clustering emerges because if player a is friend with b and b is friend with c, then a's information is likely to be shared indirectly with c anyway, making it less costly for a to befriend c. Homophily emerges because small additional benefits of friendship within a group make linkages and thus information sharing within that group more likely, further increasing the likelihood within-group links. Keywords: Network formation; Networks; Privacy 
520 |a Toulouse Network with Information Technology and ArmyResearch Office (Grant ARO MURI W911NF-12-1-0509) 
546 |a en 
655 7 |a Article 
773 |t Games and Economic Behavior