DAWG: A Defense Against Cache Timing Attacks in Speculative Execution Processors

Software side channel attacks have become a serious concern with the recent rash of attacks on speculative processor architectures. Most attacks that have been demonstrated exploit the cache tag state as their exfiltration channel. While many existing defense mechanisms that can be implemented solel...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Kiriansky, Vladimir L. (Vladimir Lubenov) (Author), Lebedev, Ilia A. (Author), Amarasinghe, Saman P (Author), Devadas, Srinivas (Author), Emer, Joel S (Author)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (Contributor), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2020-03-27T15:13:03Z.
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