Fissile material detection using neutron time-correlations from photofission

The detection of special nuclear materials (SNM) in commercial cargoes is a major objective in the field of nuclear security. In this work we investigate the use of two-neutron time-correlations from photo-fission using the Prompt Neutrons from Photofission (PNPF) detectors in Passport Systems Inc.&...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Soltz, R. A. (Author), Danagoulian, Areg (Author), Hartouni, E. P. (Author), Johnson, M. S. (Author), Sheets, S. A. (Author), Glenn, A. (Author), Korbly, S. E. (Author), Ledoux, R. J. (Author)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: AIP Publishing, 2020-03-25T15:49:14Z.
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Online Access:Get fulltext
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100 1 0 |a Soltz, R. A.  |e author 
100 1 0 |a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Nuclear Science and Engineering  |e contributor 
700 1 0 |a Danagoulian, Areg  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Hartouni, E. P.  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Johnson, M. S.  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Sheets, S. A.  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Glenn, A.  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Korbly, S. E.  |e author 
700 1 0 |a Ledoux, R. J.  |e author 
245 0 0 |a Fissile material detection using neutron time-correlations from photofission 
260 |b AIP Publishing,   |c 2020-03-25T15:49:14Z. 
856 |z Get fulltext  |u https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/124321 
520 |a The detection of special nuclear materials (SNM) in commercial cargoes is a major objective in the field of nuclear security. In this work we investigate the use of two-neutron time-correlations from photo-fission using the Prompt Neutrons from Photofission (PNPF) detectors in Passport Systems Inc.'s (PSI) Shielded Nuclear Alarm Resolution (SNAR) platform for the purpose of detecting ∼5 kg quantities of fissionable materials in seconds. The goal of this effort was to extend the secondary scan mode of this system to differentiate fissile materials, such as highly enriched uranium, from fissionable materials, such as low enriched and depleted uranium (LEU and DU). Experiments were performed using a variety of material samples, and data were analyzed using the variance-over-mean technique referred to as Y 2F or Feynman-α. Results were compared to computational models to improve our ability to predict system performance for distinguishing fissile materials. Simulations were then combined with empirical formulas to generate receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curves for a variety of shielding scenarios. We show that a 10 second screening with a 200 μA 9 MeV X-ray beam is sufficient to differentiate kilogram quantities of HEU from DU in various shielding scenarios in a standard cargo container. ©2019 
546 |a en 
655 7 |a Article 
773 |t 10.1063/1.5082174 
773 |t AIP Advances