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117186 |
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|a Kyle, Jordan
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|a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
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|a Olken, Benjamin A.
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|a Banerjee, Abhijit
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|a Hanna, Rema N.
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|a Olken, Benjamin
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|a Sumarto, Sudarno
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|a Banerjee, Abhijit
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|a Hanna, Rema N.
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|a Olken, Benjamin
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|a Tangible Information and Citizen Empowerment: Identification Cards and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia
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|b University of Chicago Press,
|c 2018-07-30T14:54:44Z.
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|z Get fulltext
|u http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/117186
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|a Redistribution programs in developing countries often "leak" because local officials do not implement programs as the central government intends. We study one approach to reducing leakage. In an experi- ment in over 550 villages, we test whether mailing cards with program information to targeted beneficiaries increases the subsidy they re- ceive from a subsidized rice program. On net, beneficiaries received 26 percent more subsidy in card villages. Ineligible households re- ceived no less, so this represents substantially lower leakage.
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|a en_US
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|a Article
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|t Journal of Political Economy
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