Political Economy in a Changing World
We provide a general framework for the analysis of institutional dynamics in an environment in which payoffs and political powers change stochastically. Assuming that economic and political institutions as well as individual types can be ordered, and preferences and the distribution of political pow...
Main Authors: | Egorov, Georgy (Author), Sonin, Konstantin (Author), Acemoglu, K. Daron (Contributor) |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics (Contributor) |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
University of Chicago Press,
2018-02-13T17:43:34Z.
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
Similar Items
-
Political model of social evolution
by: Acemoglu, Daron, et al.
Published: (2012) -
Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments
by: Acemoglu, Daron, et al.
Published: (2011) -
Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs
by: Acemoglu, Daron, et al.
Published: (2021) -
Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs
by: Acemoglu, Daron, et al.
Published: (2012) -
Social Mobility and Stability of Democracy: Reevaluating De Tocqueville*
by: Acemoglu, K. Daron, et al.
Published: (2019)