Towards secure quadratic voting

We provide an overview of some of the security issues involved in securely implementing Lalley and Weyl's "Quadratic Voting" (Lalley and Weyl, Quadratic voting, 2016), and suggest some possible implementation architectures. Our proposals blend end-to-end verifiable voting methods with...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Park, Sunoo (Contributor), Rivest, Ronald L (Contributor)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Springer-Verlag, 2017-06-27T19:38:23Z.
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Online Access:Get fulltext
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100 1 0 |a Park, Sunoo  |e author 
100 1 0 |a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory  |e contributor 
100 1 0 |a Park, Sunoo  |e contributor 
100 1 0 |a Rivest, Ronald L  |e contributor 
700 1 0 |a Rivest, Ronald L  |e author 
245 0 0 |a Towards secure quadratic voting 
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520 |a We provide an overview of some of the security issues involved in securely implementing Lalley and Weyl's "Quadratic Voting" (Lalley and Weyl, Quadratic voting, 2016), and suggest some possible implementation architectures. Our proposals blend end-to-end verifiable voting methods with anonymous payments. We also consider new refund rules for quadratic voting, such as a "lottery" method. 
520 |a National Science Foundation (U.S.) (CCF-0939370) 
520 |a National Science Foundation (U.S.) (CNS-1413920) 
546 |a en 
655 7 |a Article 
773 |t Public Choice