Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system

Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system

In this paper, we study the strategy-proofness properties of the randomized Condorcet voting system (RCVS). Discovered at several occasions independently, the RCVS is arguably the natural extension of the Condorcet method to cases where a deterministic Condorcet winner does not exists. Indeed, it se...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hoang, Le Nguyen (Contributor)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (Contributor), Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Laboratory for Information and Decision Systems (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2017-03-23T19:02:25Z.
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