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|a Sliwa, Pauline A.
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|a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
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|a Sliwa, Pauline A.
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|a In defense of moral testimony
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|b Springer Netherlands,
|c 2017-01-06T00:09:11Z.
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|z Get fulltext
|u http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/106221
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|a Moral testimony has been getting a bad name in the recent literature. It has been argued that while testimony is a perfectly fine source for nonmoral belief, there's something wrong with basing one's moral beliefs on it. This paper argues that the bad name is undeserved: Moral testimony isn't any more problematic than nonmoral testimony.
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|a Article
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|t Philosophical Studies
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