Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena?
There are lots of arguments for, or justifications of, mathematical theorems that make use of principles from physics. Do any of these constitute explanations? On the one hand, physical principles do not seem like they should be explanatorily relevant; on the other, some particular examples of physi...
Main Author: | Skow, Bradford (Contributor) |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy (Contributor) |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Oxford University Press,
2016-10-20T18:49:22Z.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Get fulltext |
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