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103989 |
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|a dc
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|a Brunnermeier, Markus K.
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|a Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics
|e contributor
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|a Simsek, Alp
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|a Simsek, Alp
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|a Xiong, Wei
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|a A Welfare Criterion For Models With Distorted Beliefs
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|b Oxford University Press,
|c 2016-08-25T18:18:38Z.
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|z Get fulltext
|u http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/103989
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|a This article proposes a welfare criterion for economies in which agents have heterogeneously distorted beliefs. Instead of taking a stand on whose belief is correct, our criterion asserts that an allocation is belief-neutral efficient (inefficient) if it is efficient (inefficient) under any convex combination of agents' beliefs. Although this criterion gives an incomplete ranking of social allocations, it can identify positive- and negative-sum speculation driven by conflicting beliefs in a broad range of economic environments.
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|a en_US
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|a Article
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|t Quarterly Journal of Economics
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