The epistemic significance of experience

The epistemic significance of experience

According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the "good case" are ways of knowing, is set out and def...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Byrne, Alex (Contributor)
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy (Contributor)
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Springer Netherlands, 2016-07-01T18:23:35Z.
Subjects:
Article
Online Access:Get fulltext
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520 |a According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the "good case" are ways of knowing, is set out and defended. 
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