Disclaiming epistemic Akrasia: arguments and commentaries
In many ways one’s quest for knowledge can go wrong. Since the publication ofAmélie Rorty’s article “Akratic Believers”, in 1983, there has been a great deal of discussion asto one particular form of flaw in reasoning to which we, as less-than-perfect rational entities,are continuously prone to in...
Main Author: | Veronica S. Campos |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2020-11-01
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Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/70659 |
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