Why Only Virtues Can Confer Epistemic Dispositions: The Occasionalist Demon
I will argue that, contrary to what happens with Schaffer’s debasing demon, that is not even able to threaten our knowledge of the external world, there is a demon —the occasionalist demon— that plays epistemic havoc merely by being possible. The occasionalist demon argues for an antirealist view o...
Main Author: | Modesto Gómez-Alonso |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Disputatio Editions-IAR
2017-12-01
|
Series: | Disputatio |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://studiahumanitatis.eu/ojs/index.php/disputatio/article/view/278 |
Similar Items
-
On Virtue, Value, and Epistemic Normativity
by: Boren, Ted (Buddy)
Published: (2015) -
The epistemology of democracy: The epistemic virtues of democracy
by: Prijić-Samaržija Snježana
Published: (2020-01-01) -
Epistemic justice as a virtue in hermeneutic psychotherapy
by: Prijić-Samaržija Snježana, et al.
Published: (2017-01-01) -
The Epistemic Good of Epistemic Responsibilist Virtues
by: Nastasia Müller
Published: (2021-07-01) -
Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony
by: Jesús VEGA ENCABO
Published: (2008-01-01)