Arnhajm's 'visual thinking': Theoretical (non)foundation

• Main Author: Todorović Milorad V.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Faculty of Philosophy, Kosovska Mitrovica 2012-01-01
• Series: Zbornik Radova Filozofskog Fakulteta u Prištini
• Subjects: visual perception; psychic apparatus; the unconscious; psychology of art; endopsychic observation
• Online Access: http://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0354-3293/2012/0354-32931201115T.pdf

In psychology, as in other sciences, surely there are concepts that are not theoretically based and are not consistently thought trough. One of these concepts that has found a significant place in the understanding of artistic creativity and psychology of art overall is Arnheim's term: 'visual perception'. It can be said, as Arnheim does, that any perception is thinking at the same time, all reasoning is also intuition, each observation invention, provided that this approach can be deduced from a psychological theory. Starting from Gestalt psychology that seems to be impossible. Understandably, Arnheim, as Gestalt psychologist, with this term wanted to point out that the whole is different than the sum of its parts. 'A visual thinking' was supposed to add something more to the perceptual experience, a property that the perception does not have. Since Gestalt psychology is not based on the psychic apparatus and deferred system, with different functions and especially those unconscious, it is difficult to talk about the theoretical grounding of this notion. Only after postulating these moments Arnheim could elaborate his view that the process of observing the world is interaction between the properties that certain object provides and observers nature. That 'nature of the observer' can only be viewed within the psychic apparatus. In the creativity (art and science), where it aims to be a basic explanatory principle, 'visual perception' is faced with difficulties such as statements from Goetea and Helmholtz, that what is important and new in their creation was given as a free forethought, and that their knowledge came as something almost complete.