Electoral instability in Iceland 1931-95: The impact of aggregate electoral volatility and block volatility on the Icelandic party system

This article examines electoral volatility in Iceland. The impact of aggregate and block volatility on the cleavage structure of the Icelandic party system is studied and compared with the situation applying to a group of west European democracies. The Icelandic parties are divided into blocks accor...

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Main Author: Sigtryggur Pétursson
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Iceland 2005-12-01
Series:Stjórnmál og Stjórnsýsla
Online Access:http://www.irpa.is/article/view/862
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spelling doaj-fb5e5970fbf142f29b0a3e9fa7a129d22020-11-24T22:05:01ZengUniversity of IcelandStjórnmál og Stjórnsýsla1670-68031670-679X2005-12-011114116210.13177/irpa.a.2005.1.1.6834Electoral instability in Iceland 1931-95: The impact of aggregate electoral volatility and block volatility on the Icelandic party systemSigtryggur PéturssonThis article examines electoral volatility in Iceland. The impact of aggregate and block volatility on the cleavage structure of the Icelandic party system is studied and compared with the situation applying to a group of west European democracies. The Icelandic parties are divided into blocks according to their stand on the socio-economic issue dimension. This gives an opportunity to see whether the high increase in electoral volatility at the aggregate level was followed by similar increase across the cleavage line, with the party system therefore becoming less and less frozen into place, as the upsurge in electoral volatility at the aggregate level seems to suggest. The main reason for the increase in volatility across the cleavage line is traced to party splitting. The main conclusion drawn is that this has not occurred in the case of Iceland. Most of the increase in volatility has occurred within the blocks and therefore the stability of the cleavage structure of the Icelandic party system has not evidenced an overall decline.http://www.irpa.is/article/view/862
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Sigtryggur Pétursson
spellingShingle Sigtryggur Pétursson
Electoral instability in Iceland 1931-95: The impact of aggregate electoral volatility and block volatility on the Icelandic party system
Stjórnmál og Stjórnsýsla
author_facet Sigtryggur Pétursson
author_sort Sigtryggur Pétursson
title Electoral instability in Iceland 1931-95: The impact of aggregate electoral volatility and block volatility on the Icelandic party system
title_short Electoral instability in Iceland 1931-95: The impact of aggregate electoral volatility and block volatility on the Icelandic party system
title_full Electoral instability in Iceland 1931-95: The impact of aggregate electoral volatility and block volatility on the Icelandic party system
title_fullStr Electoral instability in Iceland 1931-95: The impact of aggregate electoral volatility and block volatility on the Icelandic party system
title_full_unstemmed Electoral instability in Iceland 1931-95: The impact of aggregate electoral volatility and block volatility on the Icelandic party system
title_sort electoral instability in iceland 1931-95: the impact of aggregate electoral volatility and block volatility on the icelandic party system
publisher University of Iceland
series Stjórnmál og Stjórnsýsla
issn 1670-6803
1670-679X
publishDate 2005-12-01
description This article examines electoral volatility in Iceland. The impact of aggregate and block volatility on the cleavage structure of the Icelandic party system is studied and compared with the situation applying to a group of west European democracies. The Icelandic parties are divided into blocks according to their stand on the socio-economic issue dimension. This gives an opportunity to see whether the high increase in electoral volatility at the aggregate level was followed by similar increase across the cleavage line, with the party system therefore becoming less and less frozen into place, as the upsurge in electoral volatility at the aggregate level seems to suggest. The main reason for the increase in volatility across the cleavage line is traced to party splitting. The main conclusion drawn is that this has not occurred in the case of Iceland. Most of the increase in volatility has occurred within the blocks and therefore the stability of the cleavage structure of the Icelandic party system has not evidenced an overall decline.
url http://www.irpa.is/article/view/862
work_keys_str_mv AT sigtryggurpetursson electoralinstabilityiniceland193195theimpactofaggregateelectoralvolatilityandblockvolatilityontheicelandicpartysystem
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