On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations
On the standard view, all presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. But what, exactly, does this function amount to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation, or the most general burden of re...
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University of Windsor
2020-07-01
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| Series: | Informal Logic |
| Online Access: | https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/6312 |
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doaj-f9c5b5a454814c8983cff44f7c0be4272020-11-25T03:55:15ZengUniversity of WindsorInformal Logic0824-25772293-734X2020-07-0140210.22329/il.v40i2.6312On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and ExplanationsPetar Bodlović0University of Groningen, Faculty of Philosophy (Department of Theoretical Philosophy) On the standard view, all presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. But what, exactly, does this function amount to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation, or the most general burden of reasoning on their opponents? In this paper, I take into account the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions and argue that the standard accounts of deontic function are at least ambiguous (because two types of presumptions entail distinct conceptions of the “burden of proof”), and likely implausible. As a result, they require qualifications. https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/6312 |
| collection |
DOAJ |
| language |
English |
| format |
Article |
| sources |
DOAJ |
| author |
Petar Bodlović |
| spellingShingle |
Petar Bodlović On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations Informal Logic |
| author_facet |
Petar Bodlović |
| author_sort |
Petar Bodlović |
| title |
On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations |
| title_short |
On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations |
| title_full |
On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations |
| title_fullStr |
On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations |
| title_full_unstemmed |
On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations |
| title_sort |
on presumptions, burdens of proof, and explanations |
| publisher |
University of Windsor |
| series |
Informal Logic |
| issn |
0824-2577 2293-734X |
| publishDate |
2020-07-01 |
| description |
On the standard view, all presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. But what, exactly, does this function amount to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation, or the most general burden of reasoning on their opponents? In this paper, I take into account the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions and argue that the standard accounts of deontic function are at least ambiguous (because two types of presumptions entail distinct conceptions of the “burden of proof”), and likely implausible. As a result, they require qualifications.
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| url |
https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/6312 |
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