Relationship between the Process of Emergency-related Norm-Making and the Principle of the Legal State in Light of a State of Emergency in Georgia Declared on 21 March 2020

• Main Author: Nodar Kherkheulidze
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: Constitutional Court of Georgia 2020-06-01
• Series: Journal of Constitutional Law
• Subjects: emergency powers; georgia; constitutional law; human rights; pandemic and law
• Online Access: https://www.constcourt.ge/files/7/JCL%20-%20ENG%20-%20VOL%201%20(2020)%20Special%20Issue/JCL%20-%202020%20Vol.1%20Special%20Issue%20-%20ENG-91-105.pdf

Principle of the Rule of Law is a cornerstone of the Georgian Constitution and organization of the government in general. It determines the way in which government should be conducted. A key aspect of this principle is separation of powers between the branches of the government, which creates a balance among them and ensures exercise of the people’s power in a democratic, constitutional and lawful manner. At the same time, there are cases where it is impossible to preserve the said balance. During a state of emergency and martial law, the President of Georgia has the power to issue decrees that have the legal force equal to that of organic laws, thereby substituting the legislature to a certain extent. This paper addresses the issue of norm-making in a state of emergency (based on a Georgian example) and its relationship with the principle of a rule of law state. In particular, in explores whether a decree can completely substitute the law and what should its scope be; which standards are being pulled back and what the rules that should be unalterably observed during the process of norm-making are. In addition, it seeks to analyze whether it is possible to define and impose liability on grounds of the decree, and whether or not a decree can delegate certain powers to the Government of Georgia.