Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states
ABSTRACT In order to account for our engagements with fiction, several philosophers have recently introduced a class of novel mental states which they have designated as ‘i-desires’ or ‘desire-like imaginings’. Others argue against this claim by denying the existence of i-desire. In this article, I...
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doaj-f6f400a72fc4411291a23480bd9559382020-11-24T22:11:52ZengUniversidade Estadual de CampinasManuscrito2317-630X412295210.1590/0100-6045.2018.v41n2.ygS0100-60452018000200029Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable statesYuchen GUOABSTRACT In order to account for our engagements with fiction, several philosophers have recently introduced a class of novel mental states which they have designated as ‘i-desires’ or ‘desire-like imaginings’. Others argue against this claim by denying the existence of i-desire. In this article, I argue that genuine desires fail to make sense of our attitudes towards real objects in fictional situations, and that i-desire is psychologically indispensable in explaining our attitudes in such cases.http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000200029&lng=en&tlng=enI-desireDesire-like imaginingImaginationFictionPretense |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Yuchen GUO |
spellingShingle |
Yuchen GUO Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states Manuscrito I-desire Desire-like imagining Imagination Fiction Pretense |
author_facet |
Yuchen GUO |
author_sort |
Yuchen GUO |
title |
Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states |
title_short |
Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states |
title_full |
Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states |
title_fullStr |
Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states |
title_full_unstemmed |
Real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states |
title_sort |
real objects in fictional situations: an argument for i-desires as indispensable states |
publisher |
Universidade Estadual de Campinas |
series |
Manuscrito |
issn |
2317-630X |
description |
ABSTRACT In order to account for our engagements with fiction, several philosophers have recently introduced a class of novel mental states which they have designated as ‘i-desires’ or ‘desire-like imaginings’. Others argue against this claim by denying the existence of i-desire. In this article, I argue that genuine desires fail to make sense of our attitudes towards real objects in fictional situations, and that i-desire is psychologically indispensable in explaining our attitudes in such cases. |
topic |
I-desire Desire-like imagining Imagination Fiction Pretense |
url |
http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0100-60452018000200029&lng=en&tlng=en |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT yuchenguo realobjectsinfictionalsituationsanargumentforidesiresasindispensablestates |
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1725803869807575040 |