Capacity Planning of Micro Energy Grid Using Double-Level Game Model of Environment-Economic Considering Dynamic Energy Pricing Strategy

Multi-energy unified planning is difficult because of the complex conflicting relationship between the coupling and complementary interaction of multiple forms of energy in micro energy grids (MEGs). Conflicting relationships between the economy and the environment as well as the impact of uncertain...

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Main Authors: Lin Lin, Jiaruiqi Bao, Jian Zheng, Guilin Huang, Jiping Du, Nantian Huang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 2020-01-01
Series:IEEE Access
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9106354/
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spelling doaj-f5fd0bcdac6e4d32893c63a4f21473832021-03-30T02:52:52ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362020-01-01810392410394010.1109/ACCESS.2020.29993739106354Capacity Planning of Micro Energy Grid Using Double-Level Game Model of Environment-Economic Considering Dynamic Energy Pricing StrategyLin Lin0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1213-0983Jiaruiqi Bao1Jian Zheng2Guilin Huang3Jiping Du4Nantian Huang5https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8262-9499College of Information and Control Engineering, Jilin Institute of Chemical Technology, Jilin, ChinaChongqing Electric Power Skill Training Center, State Grid Company, Chongqing, ChinaJiangxi Electric Power Company, State Grid, Nanchang, ChinaState Grid Jiangxi Construction Company, Nanchang, ChinaState Grid Jiangxi Construction Company, Nanchang, ChinaKey Laboratory of Modern Power System Simulation and Control and Renewable Energy Technology, Ministry of Education (Northeast Electric Power University), Jilin, ChinaMulti-energy unified planning is difficult because of the complex conflicting relationship between the coupling and complementary interaction of multiple forms of energy in micro energy grids (MEGs). Conflicting relationships between the economy and the environment as well as the impact of uncertain energy prices must be considered during MEG planning. To address these problems, this paper proposes a two-level game with an environment-economic planning model that considers dynamic energy pricing strategies. This model consists of an upper environment-economic planning level based on a multi-strategy evolution game considering players' bounded rationality and a lower dynamic energy pricing level, including the MEG operator-user leader-follower Stackelberg game. Simultaneously, based on the energy hub theory, a multi energy coupling matrix is established for a MEG and includes electricity, gas, heat, and cooling. The evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) of the planning results is analyzed using the replicator dynamic equation of the evolutionary game, and the existence of the Nash equilibrium is proven for the dynamic energy pricing of Stackelberg games. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed environment-economic planning two-level game model considering dynamic energy pricing strategies is verified using simulations. Because dynamic energy pricing and the environment-economic planning are considered, the number of energy equipment required during peak hours is reasonably reduced, thereby reducing the total planning cost and improving the energy utilization efficiency. Simultaneously, greenhouse gas (CO2) and air pollutant (NOx) emissions are reduced to decrease environmental impact.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9106354/Micro energy griddynamic energy pricingenvironment-economic planninggame theorydynamic pricing
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Lin Lin
Jiaruiqi Bao
Jian Zheng
Guilin Huang
Jiping Du
Nantian Huang
spellingShingle Lin Lin
Jiaruiqi Bao
Jian Zheng
Guilin Huang
Jiping Du
Nantian Huang
Capacity Planning of Micro Energy Grid Using Double-Level Game Model of Environment-Economic Considering Dynamic Energy Pricing Strategy
IEEE Access
Micro energy grid
dynamic energy pricing
environment-economic planning
game theory
dynamic pricing
author_facet Lin Lin
Jiaruiqi Bao
Jian Zheng
Guilin Huang
Jiping Du
Nantian Huang
author_sort Lin Lin
title Capacity Planning of Micro Energy Grid Using Double-Level Game Model of Environment-Economic Considering Dynamic Energy Pricing Strategy
title_short Capacity Planning of Micro Energy Grid Using Double-Level Game Model of Environment-Economic Considering Dynamic Energy Pricing Strategy
title_full Capacity Planning of Micro Energy Grid Using Double-Level Game Model of Environment-Economic Considering Dynamic Energy Pricing Strategy
title_fullStr Capacity Planning of Micro Energy Grid Using Double-Level Game Model of Environment-Economic Considering Dynamic Energy Pricing Strategy
title_full_unstemmed Capacity Planning of Micro Energy Grid Using Double-Level Game Model of Environment-Economic Considering Dynamic Energy Pricing Strategy
title_sort capacity planning of micro energy grid using double-level game model of environment-economic considering dynamic energy pricing strategy
publisher IEEE
series IEEE Access
issn 2169-3536
publishDate 2020-01-01
description Multi-energy unified planning is difficult because of the complex conflicting relationship between the coupling and complementary interaction of multiple forms of energy in micro energy grids (MEGs). Conflicting relationships between the economy and the environment as well as the impact of uncertain energy prices must be considered during MEG planning. To address these problems, this paper proposes a two-level game with an environment-economic planning model that considers dynamic energy pricing strategies. This model consists of an upper environment-economic planning level based on a multi-strategy evolution game considering players' bounded rationality and a lower dynamic energy pricing level, including the MEG operator-user leader-follower Stackelberg game. Simultaneously, based on the energy hub theory, a multi energy coupling matrix is established for a MEG and includes electricity, gas, heat, and cooling. The evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) of the planning results is analyzed using the replicator dynamic equation of the evolutionary game, and the existence of the Nash equilibrium is proven for the dynamic energy pricing of Stackelberg games. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed environment-economic planning two-level game model considering dynamic energy pricing strategies is verified using simulations. Because dynamic energy pricing and the environment-economic planning are considered, the number of energy equipment required during peak hours is reasonably reduced, thereby reducing the total planning cost and improving the energy utilization efficiency. Simultaneously, greenhouse gas (CO2) and air pollutant (NOx) emissions are reduced to decrease environmental impact.
topic Micro energy grid
dynamic energy pricing
environment-economic planning
game theory
dynamic pricing
url https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9106354/
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