The Foundherentist View of Justification by Experience

I show that Susan Haack's foundherentist theory of justification accounts for the role of experience in the creation of justification (a role which has seemed mysterious since experience is not a proposition and therefore cannot, seemingly, support any propos/non). Experience causes one to be j...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: James A. Ryan
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2000-06-01
Series:Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19477/17831
id doaj-f4805c2c9ad345beb572929a62b46674
record_format Article
spelling doaj-f4805c2c9ad345beb572929a62b466742020-11-24T22:23:41ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112000-06-010417988The Foundherentist View of Justification by ExperienceJames A. RyanI show that Susan Haack's foundherentist theory of justification accounts for the role of experience in the creation of justification (a role which has seemed mysterious since experience is not a proposition and therefore cannot, seemingly, support any propos/non). Experience causes one to be justified in believing by causing certain beliefs — the truth of which is necessary to one's being justified — to be true This is revealed when we notice that, as foundherentism holds, no belief is basic in the foundationalist sense, while all beliefs derive their justification from experience, contrary to coherentism http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19477/17831ExperiencejustificationSusan Haack
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author James A. Ryan
spellingShingle James A. Ryan
The Foundherentist View of Justification by Experience
Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
Experience
justification
Susan Haack
author_facet James A. Ryan
author_sort James A. Ryan
title The Foundherentist View of Justification by Experience
title_short The Foundherentist View of Justification by Experience
title_full The Foundherentist View of Justification by Experience
title_fullStr The Foundherentist View of Justification by Experience
title_full_unstemmed The Foundherentist View of Justification by Experience
title_sort foundherentist view of justification by experience
publisher Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
series Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology
issn 1414-4247
1808-1711
publishDate 2000-06-01
description I show that Susan Haack's foundherentist theory of justification accounts for the role of experience in the creation of justification (a role which has seemed mysterious since experience is not a proposition and therefore cannot, seemingly, support any propos/non). Experience causes one to be justified in believing by causing certain beliefs — the truth of which is necessary to one's being justified — to be true This is revealed when we notice that, as foundherentism holds, no belief is basic in the foundationalist sense, while all beliefs derive their justification from experience, contrary to coherentism
topic Experience
justification
Susan Haack
url http://www.periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/19477/17831
work_keys_str_mv AT jamesaryan thefoundherentistviewofjustificationbyexperience
AT jamesaryan foundherentistviewofjustificationbyexperience
_version_ 1725764291243540480