Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model

Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model

The signal gaming model based on incomplete information is used to analyze the decisions of commercial banks and medium-sized and small enterprises (SMEs) in supply chain finance business. It is found that the returns of banks are closely relied on the probability of good SMEs join which is proporti...

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Main Authors: Zhang Tao, Xin Li, Xinquan Liu, Nana Feng
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Hindawi Limited 2019-01-01
Series:Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/3646097
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spelling doaj-f1ca0bfa179946b79fbc7c6b602b75532020-11-25T01:36:55ZengHindawi LimitedDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2019-01-01201910.1155/2019/36460973646097Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information ModelZhang Tao0Xin Li1Xinquan Liu2Nana Feng3Nanning Normal University, ChinaMacau University of Science and Technology, MacauNanning Normal University, ChinaNanning Normal University, ChinaThe signal gaming model based on incomplete information is used to analyze the decisions of commercial banks and medium-sized and small enterprises (SMEs) in supply chain finance business. It is found that the returns of banks are closely relied on the probability of good SMEs join which is proportional to θ (the probability of “good” SMEs in the market) and p (the probability of “good” SMEs chosen to join the supply chain finance) in supply chain finance business, and the default cost is an important constrain for determining the strategies adopted by the SMEs and the banks. To achieve higher returns, SMEs and banks should make effects to create a better supply chain finance business environment to achieve the separation equilibrium.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/3646097
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Zhang Tao
Xin Li
Xinquan Liu
Nana Feng
spellingShingle Zhang Tao
Xin Li
Xinquan Liu
Nana Feng
Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
author_facet Zhang Tao
Xin Li
Xinquan Liu
Nana Feng
author_sort Zhang Tao
title Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model
title_short Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model
title_full Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model
title_fullStr Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model
title_full_unstemmed Analysis of Signal Game for Supply Chain Finance (SCF) of MSEs and Banks Based on Incomplete Information Model
title_sort analysis of signal game for supply chain finance (scf) of mses and banks based on incomplete information model
publisher Hindawi Limited
series Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
issn 1026-0226
1607-887X
publishDate 2019-01-01
description The signal gaming model based on incomplete information is used to analyze the decisions of commercial banks and medium-sized and small enterprises (SMEs) in supply chain finance business. It is found that the returns of banks are closely relied on the probability of good SMEs join which is proportional to θ (the probability of “good” SMEs in the market) and p (the probability of “good” SMEs chosen to join the supply chain finance) in supply chain finance business, and the default cost is an important constrain for determining the strategies adopted by the SMEs and the banks. To achieve higher returns, SMEs and banks should make effects to create a better supply chain finance business environment to achieve the separation equilibrium.
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/3646097
work_keys_str_mv AT zhangtao analysisofsignalgameforsupplychainfinancescfofmsesandbanksbasedonincompleteinformationmodel
AT xinli analysisofsignalgameforsupplychainfinancescfofmsesandbanksbasedonincompleteinformationmodel
AT xinquanliu analysisofsignalgameforsupplychainfinancescfofmsesandbanksbasedonincompleteinformationmodel
AT nanafeng analysisofsignalgameforsupplychainfinancescfofmsesandbanksbasedonincompleteinformationmodel
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