Development and analysis of game-theoretical models of security systems agents interaction

• Main Authors: Serhii Yevseiev, Oleksandr Milov, Stanislav Milevskyi, Oleksandr Voitko, Maksym Kasianenko, Yevgen Melenti, Serhii Pohasii, Hrygorii Stepanov, Oleksandr Turinskyi, Serhii Faraon
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: PC Technology Center 2020-04-01
• Series: Eastern-European Journal of Enterprise Technologies
• Subjects: game theory; cybersecurity; stackelberg games; nash games; game equilibrium; strategy
• Online Access: http://journals.uran.ua/eejet/article/view/201418

A game-theoretic approach is presented, which claims to be a universal method for solving most problems in the field of cybersecurity. As arguments to confirm the superiority of game theory, mathematical validity and provability of the optimality of decisions made, unlike the widely used heuristics, the possibility of developing reliable protection based on analytical results, ensuring a timely response to cyberattacks in conditions of limited resources, as well as distributed nature of decision making are highlighted. The definitions of the basic concepts used in security tasks based on game-theoretic models are introduced. The features of the application of game theory methods in the field of cybersecurity are listed and the limitations of research in this area are formulated, namely: a restriction on game strategies, simultaneous moves of players in the behavior patterns of security system agents, uncertainty in the time the players take the move, uncertainty in the final goal of the enemy, unpredictability of further player moves, lack of players’ assessment of enemy resources. as well as its ultimate goals, the inability to timely assess the current state of the game. The game-theoretic models are aligned with the listed security problems, and the main solutions obtained as a result of using the corresponding models are also determined. Many methods of game theory have been formed, for each of which a relationship is determined between the game model, its scope, simulation result and security services that the method under consideration supports. The limitations of the classical representation of game theory models are determined, the need to overcome which follows from the requirements for providing basic security services. Such limitations include: the ability of the defender to detect attacks, the certainty of the probabilities of a change of state before the start of the game, the synchronism of the players’ moves, the inability to scale the model due to the size and complexity of the system under consideration. Models of the main tasks of the interaction of antagonistic agents of security systems have been developed. The resulting models made it possible to obtain solutions to two of the most common tasks in the field of cybersecurity, namely, the interaction of the system administrator and the attacker in organizing the protection of information resources. The tasks are solved for various conditions – the game matrix contains cost estimates of resources and the matrix reflects the probability of threat realization. Pure and mixed strategies are defined for various initial conditions, which allows to exclude from the consideration strategies that are not included in the solution. A synergistic approach to the use of game-theoretic modeling was formed taking into account the behavior of agents of security systems, based on an analysis of the diversity and characteristics of game-theoretic models, their inherent limitations and scope