Non-Cooperative Game in Block Bidding Markets Considering Demand Response

• Main Authors: Ningxuan Guo, Yinan Wang, Gangfeng Yan, Jian Hou
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: MDPI AG 2020-06-01
• Series: Energies
• Subjects: demand response; block bidding market; non-cooperative game; supply function; distributed iteration
• Online Access: https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/13/13/3322

With the reform of electricity markets, demand response (DR) plays an important role in providing flexibility to the markets. Block bidding market is a new market mode, which is based on the concept of "the same quality, the same price". The mechanism has great effects in reducing start-stop related costs. In this paper, we propose a double-sided non-cooperative game model in block bidding markets with a DR program. The model combines the advantages of block bidding and the simplicity of hourly bidding. In the model, one side is the non-cooperative game of supply-side power firms, and we propose a novel supply function bidding model based on block duration and load capacity to maximize each firm’s profit. The other side is the demand-side different types of customers, and we propose a DR model that combines hourly-various prices with the block bidding mechanism to maximize each customer’s payoff. The overall market optimization problem is solved by a distributed iterative algorithm, which has great convergence performance. We verify the proposed model on real data, and the results show that the demand load curve becomes flattened with DR, and the total generation costs decrease while the social welfare is significantly improved.