Conditionals in Interaction

There are several issues with the standard approach to the relationship between conditionals and assertions, particularly when the antecedent of a conditional is (or may be) false. One prominent alternative is to say that conditionals do not express propositions, but rather make conditional assertio...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Trafford James
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Sciendo 2017-03-01
Series:Studia Humana
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1515/sh-2017-0005
id doaj-f03addef1afb46db9efb0b2ce2eb488d
record_format Article
spelling doaj-f03addef1afb46db9efb0b2ce2eb488d2021-10-02T17:46:15ZengSciendoStudia Humana2299-05182017-03-0161394910.1515/sh-2017-0005sh-2017-0005Conditionals in InteractionTrafford James0University for the Creative Arts, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern IrelandThere are several issues with the standard approach to the relationship between conditionals and assertions, particularly when the antecedent of a conditional is (or may be) false. One prominent alternative is to say that conditionals do not express propositions, but rather make conditional assertions that may generate categorical assertions of the consequent in certain circumstances. However, this view has consequences that jar with standard interpretations of the relationship between proofs and assertion. Here, I analyse this relationship, and say that, on at least one understanding of proof, conditional assertions may reflect the dynamics of proving, which (sometimes) generate categorical assertions. In particular, when we think about the relationship between assertion and proof as rooted in a dialogical approach to both, the distinction between conditional and categorical assertions is quite natural.https://doi.org/10.1515/sh-2017-0005conditionsinteractionassertionproof
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Trafford James
spellingShingle Trafford James
Conditionals in Interaction
Studia Humana
conditions
interaction
assertion
proof
author_facet Trafford James
author_sort Trafford James
title Conditionals in Interaction
title_short Conditionals in Interaction
title_full Conditionals in Interaction
title_fullStr Conditionals in Interaction
title_full_unstemmed Conditionals in Interaction
title_sort conditionals in interaction
publisher Sciendo
series Studia Humana
issn 2299-0518
publishDate 2017-03-01
description There are several issues with the standard approach to the relationship between conditionals and assertions, particularly when the antecedent of a conditional is (or may be) false. One prominent alternative is to say that conditionals do not express propositions, but rather make conditional assertions that may generate categorical assertions of the consequent in certain circumstances. However, this view has consequences that jar with standard interpretations of the relationship between proofs and assertion. Here, I analyse this relationship, and say that, on at least one understanding of proof, conditional assertions may reflect the dynamics of proving, which (sometimes) generate categorical assertions. In particular, when we think about the relationship between assertion and proof as rooted in a dialogical approach to both, the distinction between conditional and categorical assertions is quite natural.
topic conditions
interaction
assertion
proof
url https://doi.org/10.1515/sh-2017-0005
work_keys_str_mv AT traffordjames conditionalsininteraction
_version_ 1716850588637986816