Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity
Abstract Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we investigate stability of cooperation in the donation...
Main Authors: | Sanghun Lee, Yohsuke Murase, Seung Ki Baek |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Nature Publishing Group
2021-07-01
|
Series: | Scientific Reports |
Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-93598-7 |
Similar Items
-
Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity.
by: Szabolcs Számadó, et al.
Published: (2016-01-01) -
Cooperation under indirect reciprocity and imitative trust.
by: Serguei Saavedra, et al.
Published: (2010-01-01) -
Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
by: Yohsuke Murase, et al.
Published: (2020-08-01) -
Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game.
by: Yohsuke Murase, et al.
Published: (2021-01-01) -
Partner Choice Drives the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity.
by: Gilbert Roberts
Published: (2015-01-01)