Rethinking the role of top-down attention in vision: effects attributable to a lossy representation in peripheral vision

Common wisdom in the field of human vision suggests that top-down selective attention is required in order to bind features into objects. Without selective attention, presumably we are unable even to distinguish such simple stimuli as a rotated T vs. a rotated L. Selective attention, in turn, is oft...

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Main Authors: Ruth eRosenholtz, Jie eHuang, Krista A. Ehinger
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Frontiers Media S.A. 2012-02-01
Series:Frontiers in Psychology
Subjects:
Online Access:http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00013/full
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spelling doaj-edae08b4f79a47cd80f0bb423404e26a2020-11-25T01:09:19ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Psychology1664-10782012-02-01310.3389/fpsyg.2012.0001317385Rethinking the role of top-down attention in vision: effects attributable to a lossy representation in peripheral visionRuth eRosenholtz0Ruth eRosenholtz1Jie eHuang2Krista A. Ehinger3Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCommon wisdom in the field of human vision suggests that top-down selective attention is required in order to bind features into objects. Without selective attention, presumably we are unable even to distinguish such simple stimuli as a rotated T vs. a rotated L. Selective attention, in turn, is often described as volitional and involving intentionality, suggesting – implicitly or explicitly – that it requires awareness. The resulting implication that we might need so expensive (and possibly human) a resource as consciousness in order to perform so basic a function as perception is improbable and counter-intuitive. In fact, we can carry out complex sensorimotor tasks, seemingly in the near absence of awareness or volitional shifts of attention (zombie behaviors). More generally, the tight association between attention and awareness, and the presumed role of attention on perception, is problematic.We propose that under normal viewing conditions, top-down selective attention does have an effect, but is not the critical determinant of feature binding and perception. Recent work on the nature of the representation in early vision instead attributes significant information loss to limitations of peripheral vision. We argue that this lossy representation leads to perceptual ambiguities often interpreted as a lack of feature binding, but is sufficiently rich to explain performance in such complex tasks as recognizing the gist of a scene, noticing popout targets, and navigating. These results are consistent with the notion that (largely non-volitional) shifts of the point of gaze may bear the primary responsibility for determining the information available to the visual system. The available information, in turn, provides a key determinant of the visual system’s capabilities and deficiencies. This scheme dissociates basic perceptual operations, such as feature binding, from both top-down attention and conscious awareness.http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00013/fullselective attentionModelperipheral visionscene perceptionsearchcompression
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Ruth eRosenholtz
Ruth eRosenholtz
Jie eHuang
Krista A. Ehinger
spellingShingle Ruth eRosenholtz
Ruth eRosenholtz
Jie eHuang
Krista A. Ehinger
Rethinking the role of top-down attention in vision: effects attributable to a lossy representation in peripheral vision
Frontiers in Psychology
selective attention
Model
peripheral vision
scene perception
search
compression
author_facet Ruth eRosenholtz
Ruth eRosenholtz
Jie eHuang
Krista A. Ehinger
author_sort Ruth eRosenholtz
title Rethinking the role of top-down attention in vision: effects attributable to a lossy representation in peripheral vision
title_short Rethinking the role of top-down attention in vision: effects attributable to a lossy representation in peripheral vision
title_full Rethinking the role of top-down attention in vision: effects attributable to a lossy representation in peripheral vision
title_fullStr Rethinking the role of top-down attention in vision: effects attributable to a lossy representation in peripheral vision
title_full_unstemmed Rethinking the role of top-down attention in vision: effects attributable to a lossy representation in peripheral vision
title_sort rethinking the role of top-down attention in vision: effects attributable to a lossy representation in peripheral vision
publisher Frontiers Media S.A.
series Frontiers in Psychology
issn 1664-1078
publishDate 2012-02-01
description Common wisdom in the field of human vision suggests that top-down selective attention is required in order to bind features into objects. Without selective attention, presumably we are unable even to distinguish such simple stimuli as a rotated T vs. a rotated L. Selective attention, in turn, is often described as volitional and involving intentionality, suggesting – implicitly or explicitly – that it requires awareness. The resulting implication that we might need so expensive (and possibly human) a resource as consciousness in order to perform so basic a function as perception is improbable and counter-intuitive. In fact, we can carry out complex sensorimotor tasks, seemingly in the near absence of awareness or volitional shifts of attention (zombie behaviors). More generally, the tight association between attention and awareness, and the presumed role of attention on perception, is problematic.We propose that under normal viewing conditions, top-down selective attention does have an effect, but is not the critical determinant of feature binding and perception. Recent work on the nature of the representation in early vision instead attributes significant information loss to limitations of peripheral vision. We argue that this lossy representation leads to perceptual ambiguities often interpreted as a lack of feature binding, but is sufficiently rich to explain performance in such complex tasks as recognizing the gist of a scene, noticing popout targets, and navigating. These results are consistent with the notion that (largely non-volitional) shifts of the point of gaze may bear the primary responsibility for determining the information available to the visual system. The available information, in turn, provides a key determinant of the visual system’s capabilities and deficiencies. This scheme dissociates basic perceptual operations, such as feature binding, from both top-down attention and conscious awareness.
topic selective attention
Model
peripheral vision
scene perception
search
compression
url http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00013/full
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