The possibility of imagining pain

In Imagined and delusional pain Jennifer Radden aims to show that experiences of pain – and in particular, the pain associated with depression – cannot be merely delusional. Her reasoning relies crucially on the claim that the feeling of pain is imaginatively beyond our reach. Though she thinks that...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Amy Kind
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Mimesis Edizioni, Milano 2021-08-01
Series:Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2021.0016
id doaj-e91d9997602a4398806ca3287a468111
record_format Article
spelling doaj-e91d9997602a4398806ca3287a4681112021-09-05T11:26:23ZdeuMimesis Edizioni, MilanoRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia2039-46672239-26292021-08-0112218318910.4453/rifp.2021.0016The possibility of imagining painAmy KindIn Imagined and delusional pain Jennifer Radden aims to show that experiences of pain – and in particular, the pain associated with depression – cannot be merely delusional. Her reasoning relies crucially on the claim that the feeling of pain is imaginatively beyond our reach. Though she thinks that there are many ways that one can imagine scenarios involving oneself being in pain, she argues that one cannot imagine the feeling of pain itself. In this commentary, I target this claim in an attempt to show that Radden is mistaken. My argument relies on facts about individual differences involving imagination. To my mind, arguments like Radden’s involve an unfortunate slide from an “I can’t imagine…” claim to an “It can’t be imagined claim…” To support my argument, I also call upon empirical findings concerning pain imagination. As I conclude, we have no reason to think that the feeling of pain is something that is, in principle, unimaginable.https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2021.0016painimaginationfeeling of paindelusion
collection DOAJ
language deu
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Amy Kind
spellingShingle Amy Kind
The possibility of imagining pain
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
pain
imagination
feeling of pain
delusion
author_facet Amy Kind
author_sort Amy Kind
title The possibility of imagining pain
title_short The possibility of imagining pain
title_full The possibility of imagining pain
title_fullStr The possibility of imagining pain
title_full_unstemmed The possibility of imagining pain
title_sort possibility of imagining pain
publisher Mimesis Edizioni, Milano
series Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
issn 2039-4667
2239-2629
publishDate 2021-08-01
description In Imagined and delusional pain Jennifer Radden aims to show that experiences of pain – and in particular, the pain associated with depression – cannot be merely delusional. Her reasoning relies crucially on the claim that the feeling of pain is imaginatively beyond our reach. Though she thinks that there are many ways that one can imagine scenarios involving oneself being in pain, she argues that one cannot imagine the feeling of pain itself. In this commentary, I target this claim in an attempt to show that Radden is mistaken. My argument relies on facts about individual differences involving imagination. To my mind, arguments like Radden’s involve an unfortunate slide from an “I can’t imagine…” claim to an “It can’t be imagined claim…” To support my argument, I also call upon empirical findings concerning pain imagination. As I conclude, we have no reason to think that the feeling of pain is something that is, in principle, unimaginable.
topic pain
imagination
feeling of pain
delusion
url https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2021.0016
work_keys_str_mv AT amykind thepossibilityofimaginingpain
AT amykind possibilityofimaginingpain
_version_ 1717814294142255104