The possibility of imagining pain
In Imagined and delusional pain Jennifer Radden aims to show that experiences of pain – and in particular, the pain associated with depression – cannot be merely delusional. Her reasoning relies crucially on the claim that the feeling of pain is imaginatively beyond our reach. Though she thinks that...
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Mimesis Edizioni, Milano
2021-08-01
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Online Access: | https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2021.0016 |
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doaj-e91d9997602a4398806ca3287a4681112021-09-05T11:26:23ZdeuMimesis Edizioni, MilanoRivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia2039-46672239-26292021-08-0112218318910.4453/rifp.2021.0016The possibility of imagining painAmy KindIn Imagined and delusional pain Jennifer Radden aims to show that experiences of pain – and in particular, the pain associated with depression – cannot be merely delusional. Her reasoning relies crucially on the claim that the feeling of pain is imaginatively beyond our reach. Though she thinks that there are many ways that one can imagine scenarios involving oneself being in pain, she argues that one cannot imagine the feeling of pain itself. In this commentary, I target this claim in an attempt to show that Radden is mistaken. My argument relies on facts about individual differences involving imagination. To my mind, arguments like Radden’s involve an unfortunate slide from an “I can’t imagine…” claim to an “It can’t be imagined claim…” To support my argument, I also call upon empirical findings concerning pain imagination. As I conclude, we have no reason to think that the feeling of pain is something that is, in principle, unimaginable.https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2021.0016painimaginationfeeling of paindelusion |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
deu |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Amy Kind |
spellingShingle |
Amy Kind The possibility of imagining pain Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia pain imagination feeling of pain delusion |
author_facet |
Amy Kind |
author_sort |
Amy Kind |
title |
The possibility of imagining pain |
title_short |
The possibility of imagining pain |
title_full |
The possibility of imagining pain |
title_fullStr |
The possibility of imagining pain |
title_full_unstemmed |
The possibility of imagining pain |
title_sort |
possibility of imagining pain |
publisher |
Mimesis Edizioni, Milano |
series |
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia |
issn |
2039-4667 2239-2629 |
publishDate |
2021-08-01 |
description |
In Imagined and delusional pain Jennifer Radden aims to show that experiences of pain – and in particular, the pain associated with depression – cannot be merely delusional. Her reasoning relies crucially on the claim that the feeling of pain is imaginatively beyond our reach. Though she thinks that there are many ways that one can imagine scenarios involving oneself being in pain, she argues that one cannot imagine the feeling of pain itself. In this commentary, I target this claim in an attempt to show that Radden is mistaken. My argument relies on facts about individual differences involving imagination. To my mind, arguments like Radden’s involve an unfortunate slide from an “I can’t imagine…” claim to an “It can’t be imagined claim…” To support my argument, I also call upon empirical findings concerning pain imagination. As I conclude, we have no reason to think that the feeling of pain is something that is, in principle, unimaginable. |
topic |
pain imagination feeling of pain delusion |
url |
https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2021.0016 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT amykind thepossibilityofimaginingpain AT amykind possibilityofimaginingpain |
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