Affect and Sense
In this paper, we defend that what is meaningful and sensible to us is also affective. Our mental operations and actions in the world are affectively oriented. In the first section, we discuss how sense and affect have been conceived of under traditional conceptions of mind and body. In the second s...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
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Universidad Pontificia Comillas
2019-07-01
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| Series: | Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación e Información Filosófica |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://revistas.comillas.edu/index.php/pensamiento/article/view/8134 |
| Summary: | In this paper, we defend that what is meaningful and sensible to us is also affective. Our mental operations and actions in the world are affectively oriented. In the first section, we discuss how sense and affect have been conceived of under traditional conceptions of mind and body. In the second section, we propose a conception of sense as public, embodied and constituted by affect. To this purpose, we rely on the commonalities on sense and affect that can be found on the philosophies of L. Wittgenstein and M. Merleau-Ponty. Finally, in the third section, we discuss the implications of the idea we have defended; we will discuss some important differences with approaches similar to ours and some objections to them. |
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| ISSN: | 0031-4749 2386-5822 |