The Dynamics of the Discrete Ultimatum Game and the Role of the Expectation Level

We have studied evolutionary ultimatum game with spatially arranged players, who have choice between the two kinds of strategies (named greedy and altruist). The strategies in the ultimatum game here are described by p(i) and a(i), that is, the probability of offering i to himself and the accepting...

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Main Authors: Lili Deng, Wei Zhang, Cheng Wang, Yi Han, Jianhu Cai
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Hindawi Limited 2016-01-01
Series:Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/8517345
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spelling doaj-e82e00a381f844419e7d5a8e0be0eaef2020-11-24T22:51:12ZengHindawi LimitedDiscrete Dynamics in Nature and Society1026-02261607-887X2016-01-01201610.1155/2016/85173458517345The Dynamics of the Discrete Ultimatum Game and the Role of the Expectation LevelLili Deng0Wei Zhang1Cheng Wang2Yi Han3Jianhu Cai4Institute of Systems Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, ChinaInstitute of Systems Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, ChinaInstitute of Industrial Engineering, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310014, ChinaCollege of Economics and Management, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, ChinaCollege of Economics and Management, Zhejiang University of Technology, Hangzhou 310023, ChinaWe have studied evolutionary ultimatum game with spatially arranged players, who have choice between the two kinds of strategies (named greedy and altruist). The strategies in the ultimatum game here are described by p(i) and a(i), that is, the probability of offering i to himself and the accepting probability when receiving i. By using computer simulations with C++ builder, we have provided the dynamics of the greedy and altruistic strategies and found that the proportion evolution of the “greedy” strategy for different initial cases is approximately 60%. Furthermore, the explanations for the interesting phenomenon are presented from different aspects. In addition, we illustrate that the factor of the expectation level (aspiration level) in the updating rule plays an important role in the promotion of altruistic behaviors.http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/8517345
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Lili Deng
Wei Zhang
Cheng Wang
Yi Han
Jianhu Cai
spellingShingle Lili Deng
Wei Zhang
Cheng Wang
Yi Han
Jianhu Cai
The Dynamics of the Discrete Ultimatum Game and the Role of the Expectation Level
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
author_facet Lili Deng
Wei Zhang
Cheng Wang
Yi Han
Jianhu Cai
author_sort Lili Deng
title The Dynamics of the Discrete Ultimatum Game and the Role of the Expectation Level
title_short The Dynamics of the Discrete Ultimatum Game and the Role of the Expectation Level
title_full The Dynamics of the Discrete Ultimatum Game and the Role of the Expectation Level
title_fullStr The Dynamics of the Discrete Ultimatum Game and the Role of the Expectation Level
title_full_unstemmed The Dynamics of the Discrete Ultimatum Game and the Role of the Expectation Level
title_sort dynamics of the discrete ultimatum game and the role of the expectation level
publisher Hindawi Limited
series Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
issn 1026-0226
1607-887X
publishDate 2016-01-01
description We have studied evolutionary ultimatum game with spatially arranged players, who have choice between the two kinds of strategies (named greedy and altruist). The strategies in the ultimatum game here are described by p(i) and a(i), that is, the probability of offering i to himself and the accepting probability when receiving i. By using computer simulations with C++ builder, we have provided the dynamics of the greedy and altruistic strategies and found that the proportion evolution of the “greedy” strategy for different initial cases is approximately 60%. Furthermore, the explanations for the interesting phenomenon are presented from different aspects. In addition, we illustrate that the factor of the expectation level (aspiration level) in the updating rule plays an important role in the promotion of altruistic behaviors.
url http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2016/8517345
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