Double Moral Hazard in Buy-Back Oil Contracts
This research is modeling third generation of buy back oil contracts by considering a double moral hazard and employing Cubb-Douglas production function. The result shows that buy-back oil contracts are not in the first best or second best in double moral situation. Ove to this type of contracts is...
Main Authors: | Hamidreza Maboudi, Mohammadmahdi Askari |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | fas |
Published: |
Allameh Tabataba'i University Press
2017-04-01
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Series: | Pizhūhishnāmah-i Iqtiṣād-i Inirzhī-i Īrān |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://jiee.atu.ac.ir/article_7997_5e3cced387c1b4283853b8a774f6cd15.pdf |
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