Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market

This paper systematically discusses two-population asymmetric evolutionary games (2PAEGs) from the perspective of decision-making behavior characteristics, and applies these game models to a two-population supply-side electric power bidding market. First, a 2PAEG model is established. Then, complete...

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Main Authors: Zeng Kaiwen, Cheng Lefeng, Liu Jianing, Wang Haizhu, Yu Tao
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: EDP Sciences 2020-01-01
Series:E3S Web of Conferences
Online Access:https://www.e3s-conferences.org/articles/e3sconf/pdf/2020/54/e3sconf_icaeer2020_03009.pdf
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spelling doaj-e78b53526d954f3a85edd009052a18c52021-04-02T13:04:36ZengEDP SciencesE3S Web of Conferences2267-12422020-01-011940300910.1051/e3sconf/202019403009e3sconf_icaeer2020_03009Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding MarketZeng Kaiwen0Cheng Lefeng1Liu Jianing2Wang Haizhu3Yu Tao4Power Dispatching Control Center of Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd.School of Electric Power, South China University of TechnologyPower Dispatching Control Center of Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd.Power Dispatching Control Center of Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd.School of Electric Power, South China University of TechnologyThis paper systematically discusses two-population asymmetric evolutionary games (2PAEGs) from the perspective of decision-making behavior characteristics, and applies these game models to a two-population supply-side electric power bidding market. First, a 2PAEG model is established. Then, complete evolutionary equilibrium rules of this model are revealed during decision-making processes. Discussion shows that final evolutionary game equilibria achieved in the 2PAEG model are only determined by some payoff parameters, which are defined as relative net payoff (RNP) parameters in this paper. Finally, a case study of supply-side bidding simulation for two generator populations is conducted, which can effectively verify the universality and effectiveness of the evolutionary dynamics results obtained in the established general 2PAEG model. Moreover, it shows that reasonable policies made by the government can guide more appropriate power bidding for onto-grid electricity.https://www.e3s-conferences.org/articles/e3sconf/pdf/2020/54/e3sconf_icaeer2020_03009.pdf
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Zeng Kaiwen
Cheng Lefeng
Liu Jianing
Wang Haizhu
Yu Tao
spellingShingle Zeng Kaiwen
Cheng Lefeng
Liu Jianing
Wang Haizhu
Yu Tao
Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market
E3S Web of Conferences
author_facet Zeng Kaiwen
Cheng Lefeng
Liu Jianing
Wang Haizhu
Yu Tao
author_sort Zeng Kaiwen
title Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market
title_short Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market
title_full Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market
title_fullStr Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market
title_full_unstemmed Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market
title_sort two-population asymmetric evolutionary game dynamics-based decision-making behavior analysis for a supply-side electric power bidding market
publisher EDP Sciences
series E3S Web of Conferences
issn 2267-1242
publishDate 2020-01-01
description This paper systematically discusses two-population asymmetric evolutionary games (2PAEGs) from the perspective of decision-making behavior characteristics, and applies these game models to a two-population supply-side electric power bidding market. First, a 2PAEG model is established. Then, complete evolutionary equilibrium rules of this model are revealed during decision-making processes. Discussion shows that final evolutionary game equilibria achieved in the 2PAEG model are only determined by some payoff parameters, which are defined as relative net payoff (RNP) parameters in this paper. Finally, a case study of supply-side bidding simulation for two generator populations is conducted, which can effectively verify the universality and effectiveness of the evolutionary dynamics results obtained in the established general 2PAEG model. Moreover, it shows that reasonable policies made by the government can guide more appropriate power bidding for onto-grid electricity.
url https://www.e3s-conferences.org/articles/e3sconf/pdf/2020/54/e3sconf_icaeer2020_03009.pdf
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