Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market
This paper systematically discusses two-population asymmetric evolutionary games (2PAEGs) from the perspective of decision-making behavior characteristics, and applies these game models to a two-population supply-side electric power bidding market. First, a 2PAEG model is established. Then, complete...
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EDP Sciences
2020-01-01
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doaj-e78b53526d954f3a85edd009052a18c52021-04-02T13:04:36ZengEDP SciencesE3S Web of Conferences2267-12422020-01-011940300910.1051/e3sconf/202019403009e3sconf_icaeer2020_03009Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding MarketZeng Kaiwen0Cheng Lefeng1Liu Jianing2Wang Haizhu3Yu Tao4Power Dispatching Control Center of Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd.School of Electric Power, South China University of TechnologyPower Dispatching Control Center of Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd.Power Dispatching Control Center of Guangdong Power Grid Co., Ltd.School of Electric Power, South China University of TechnologyThis paper systematically discusses two-population asymmetric evolutionary games (2PAEGs) from the perspective of decision-making behavior characteristics, and applies these game models to a two-population supply-side electric power bidding market. First, a 2PAEG model is established. Then, complete evolutionary equilibrium rules of this model are revealed during decision-making processes. Discussion shows that final evolutionary game equilibria achieved in the 2PAEG model are only determined by some payoff parameters, which are defined as relative net payoff (RNP) parameters in this paper. Finally, a case study of supply-side bidding simulation for two generator populations is conducted, which can effectively verify the universality and effectiveness of the evolutionary dynamics results obtained in the established general 2PAEG model. Moreover, it shows that reasonable policies made by the government can guide more appropriate power bidding for onto-grid electricity.https://www.e3s-conferences.org/articles/e3sconf/pdf/2020/54/e3sconf_icaeer2020_03009.pdf |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Zeng Kaiwen Cheng Lefeng Liu Jianing Wang Haizhu Yu Tao |
spellingShingle |
Zeng Kaiwen Cheng Lefeng Liu Jianing Wang Haizhu Yu Tao Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market E3S Web of Conferences |
author_facet |
Zeng Kaiwen Cheng Lefeng Liu Jianing Wang Haizhu Yu Tao |
author_sort |
Zeng Kaiwen |
title |
Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market |
title_short |
Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market |
title_full |
Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market |
title_fullStr |
Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market |
title_full_unstemmed |
Two-population Asymmetric Evolutionary Game Dynamics-based Decision-making Behavior Analysis for A Supply-side Electric Power Bidding Market |
title_sort |
two-population asymmetric evolutionary game dynamics-based decision-making behavior analysis for a supply-side electric power bidding market |
publisher |
EDP Sciences |
series |
E3S Web of Conferences |
issn |
2267-1242 |
publishDate |
2020-01-01 |
description |
This paper systematically discusses two-population asymmetric evolutionary games (2PAEGs) from the perspective of decision-making behavior characteristics, and applies these game models to a two-population supply-side electric power bidding market. First, a 2PAEG model is established. Then, complete evolutionary equilibrium rules of this model are revealed during decision-making processes. Discussion shows that final evolutionary game equilibria achieved in the 2PAEG model are only determined by some payoff parameters, which are defined as relative net payoff (RNP) parameters in this paper. Finally, a case study of supply-side bidding simulation for two generator populations is conducted, which can effectively verify the universality and effectiveness of the evolutionary dynamics results obtained in the established general 2PAEG model. Moreover, it shows that reasonable policies made by the government can guide more appropriate power bidding for onto-grid electricity. |
url |
https://www.e3s-conferences.org/articles/e3sconf/pdf/2020/54/e3sconf_icaeer2020_03009.pdf |
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