| Summary: | This paper systematically discusses two-population asymmetric evolutionary games (2PAEGs) from the perspective of decision-making behavior characteristics, and applies these game models to a two-population supply-side electric power bidding market. First, a 2PAEG model is established. Then, complete evolutionary equilibrium rules of this model are revealed during decision-making processes. Discussion shows that final evolutionary game equilibria achieved in the 2PAEG model are only determined by some payoff parameters, which are defined as relative net payoff (RNP) parameters in this paper. Finally, a case study of supply-side bidding simulation for two generator populations is conducted, which can effectively verify the universality and effectiveness of the evolutionary dynamics results obtained in the established general 2PAEG model. Moreover, it shows that reasonable policies made by the government can guide more appropriate power bidding for onto-grid electricity.
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