Comparison Between Seller and Buyer Pricing Systems for Energy Trading in Microgrids

In this paper, two systems for energy trading among energy prosumers are proposed: a buyer-pricing-system (BPS), in which buyers determine the price of energy and a seller-pricing-system (SPS) in which sellers determine the price of energy. In order to analyze the BPS, the competition among buyers i...

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Main Authors: Sohee Bae, Sangdon Park
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 2019-01-01
Series:IEEE Access
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8695014/
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spelling doaj-e4ca7e8a8e1340198bcbb9d48cc2d6282021-03-29T22:02:26ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362019-01-017540845409610.1109/ACCESS.2019.29127588695014Comparison Between Seller and Buyer Pricing Systems for Energy Trading in MicrogridsSohee Bae0Sangdon Park1https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5392-749XSchool of Electrical Engineering, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, South KoreaInformation and Electronics Research Institute, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, South KoreaIn this paper, two systems for energy trading among energy prosumers are proposed: a buyer-pricing-system (BPS), in which buyers determine the price of energy and a seller-pricing-system (SPS) in which sellers determine the price of energy. In order to analyze the BPS, the competition among buyers in the BPS is formulated as a strategic form game named energy-competition-game among buyers (ECG-AB). It is shown that the Nash equilibrium of the ECG-AB exists and furthermore is unique. Both systems are formulated by Stackelberg duopoly game model, and it is shown that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which implies that each system is stable. Now, in the SPS, it is shown that an equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg duopoly game model does not reduce social welfare. Thus, the analysis shows that the considered systems are stable and efficient. In order to corroborate the analysis, simulation is performed and numerical results validate the analysis; a full simulation code to simulate the proposed systems is available on GitHub.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8695014/Energy prosumerenergy tradingbuyer pricingseller pricingstackelberg duopoly
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Sohee Bae
Sangdon Park
spellingShingle Sohee Bae
Sangdon Park
Comparison Between Seller and Buyer Pricing Systems for Energy Trading in Microgrids
IEEE Access
Energy prosumer
energy trading
buyer pricing
seller pricing
stackelberg duopoly
author_facet Sohee Bae
Sangdon Park
author_sort Sohee Bae
title Comparison Between Seller and Buyer Pricing Systems for Energy Trading in Microgrids
title_short Comparison Between Seller and Buyer Pricing Systems for Energy Trading in Microgrids
title_full Comparison Between Seller and Buyer Pricing Systems for Energy Trading in Microgrids
title_fullStr Comparison Between Seller and Buyer Pricing Systems for Energy Trading in Microgrids
title_full_unstemmed Comparison Between Seller and Buyer Pricing Systems for Energy Trading in Microgrids
title_sort comparison between seller and buyer pricing systems for energy trading in microgrids
publisher IEEE
series IEEE Access
issn 2169-3536
publishDate 2019-01-01
description In this paper, two systems for energy trading among energy prosumers are proposed: a buyer-pricing-system (BPS), in which buyers determine the price of energy and a seller-pricing-system (SPS) in which sellers determine the price of energy. In order to analyze the BPS, the competition among buyers in the BPS is formulated as a strategic form game named energy-competition-game among buyers (ECG-AB). It is shown that the Nash equilibrium of the ECG-AB exists and furthermore is unique. Both systems are formulated by Stackelberg duopoly game model, and it is shown that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which implies that each system is stable. Now, in the SPS, it is shown that an equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg duopoly game model does not reduce social welfare. Thus, the analysis shows that the considered systems are stable and efficient. In order to corroborate the analysis, simulation is performed and numerical results validate the analysis; a full simulation code to simulate the proposed systems is available on GitHub.
topic Energy prosumer
energy trading
buyer pricing
seller pricing
stackelberg duopoly
url https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8695014/
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