The evolution and importance of 'rules-in-use' and low-level penalties in village-level collective action
In many parts of sub-Saharan Africa community water points are provided through external support in the form of enhanced boreholes fitted with hand pumps. The external agency supplying the improved water source commonly provides maintenance training and assists in organising a governance plan for t...
Main Authors: | , |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Water Alternatives Association
2018-06-01
|
Series: | Water Alternatives |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/vol11/v11issue2/438-a11-2-5/file |
id |
doaj-e4500d08094c4615a20d58ee39107967 |
---|---|
record_format |
Article |
spelling |
doaj-e4500d08094c4615a20d58ee391079672020-11-24T23:10:45ZengWater Alternatives AssociationWater Alternatives1965-01751965-01752018-06-01112 297313The evolution and importance of 'rules-in-use' and low-level penalties in village-level collective action Brian Joubert0Robert Summers 1University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, CanadaUniversity of Alberta, Edmonton, AB, Canada In many parts of sub-Saharan Africa community water points are provided through external support in the form of enhanced boreholes fitted with hand pumps. The external agency supplying the improved water source commonly provides maintenance training and assists in organising a governance plan for the water point. Despite its apparent virtues the Village-Level Operation and Maintenance model still experiences high levels of water point failures, even where the technical training and material conditions are adequate. There has been relatively little investigation of the institutional factors that may influence the cases where villages successfully maintain their shared water source infrastructure. This research investigated five villages in central Malawi where communities had maintained their water point hand pumps for periods exceeding 10 years. The results point to the importance of informal institutions giving primacy to ad-hoc 'rules-in-use' that suit the local context, and adapting forms of free-rider sanctions that are typically minor, low level and triangulated with local norms and behaviours. The findings highlight collective action that is successful through day-to-day adaption and that serves to institutionalise cooperative behaviour through appeals to norms.http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/vol11/v11issue2/438-a11-2-5/fileShared resourceswaterinstitutionscollective actionruleshand pumpMalawi |
collection |
DOAJ |
language |
English |
format |
Article |
sources |
DOAJ |
author |
Brian Joubert Robert Summers |
spellingShingle |
Brian Joubert Robert Summers The evolution and importance of 'rules-in-use' and low-level penalties in village-level collective action Water Alternatives Shared resources water institutions collective action rules hand pump Malawi |
author_facet |
Brian Joubert Robert Summers |
author_sort |
Brian Joubert |
title |
The evolution and importance of 'rules-in-use' and low-level penalties in village-level collective action |
title_short |
The evolution and importance of 'rules-in-use' and low-level penalties in village-level collective action |
title_full |
The evolution and importance of 'rules-in-use' and low-level penalties in village-level collective action |
title_fullStr |
The evolution and importance of 'rules-in-use' and low-level penalties in village-level collective action |
title_full_unstemmed |
The evolution and importance of 'rules-in-use' and low-level penalties in village-level collective action |
title_sort |
evolution and importance of 'rules-in-use' and low-level penalties in village-level collective action |
publisher |
Water Alternatives Association |
series |
Water Alternatives |
issn |
1965-0175 1965-0175 |
publishDate |
2018-06-01 |
description |
In many parts of sub-Saharan Africa community water points are provided through external support in the form of enhanced boreholes fitted with hand pumps. The external agency supplying the improved water source commonly provides maintenance training and assists in organising a governance plan for the water point. Despite its apparent virtues the Village-Level Operation and Maintenance model still experiences high levels of water point failures, even where the technical training and material conditions are adequate. There has been relatively little investigation of the institutional factors that may influence the cases where villages successfully maintain their shared water source infrastructure. This research investigated five villages in central Malawi where communities had maintained their water point hand pumps for periods exceeding 10 years. The results point to the importance of informal institutions giving primacy to ad-hoc 'rules-in-use' that suit the local context, and adapting forms of free-rider sanctions that are typically minor, low level and triangulated with local norms and behaviours. The findings highlight collective action that is successful through day-to-day adaption and that serves to institutionalise cooperative behaviour through appeals to norms. |
topic |
Shared resources water institutions collective action rules hand pump Malawi |
url |
http://www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/alldoc/articles/vol11/v11issue2/438-a11-2-5/file |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT brianjoubert theevolutionandimportanceofrulesinuseandlowlevelpenaltiesinvillagelevelcollectiveaction AT robertsummers theevolutionandimportanceofrulesinuseandlowlevelpenaltiesinvillagelevelcollectiveaction AT brianjoubert evolutionandimportanceofrulesinuseandlowlevelpenaltiesinvillagelevelcollectiveaction AT robertsummers evolutionandimportanceofrulesinuseandlowlevelpenaltiesinvillagelevelcollectiveaction |
_version_ |
1725605771371085824 |