Budget Allocation in a Competitive Communication Spectrum Economy

This study discusses how to adjust “monetary budget” to meet each user's physical power demand, or balance all individual utilities in a competitive “spectrum market” of a communication system. In the market, multiple users share a common frequency or...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ming-Hua Lin, Jung-Fa Tsai, Yinyu Ye
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: SpringerOpen 2009-01-01
Series:EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing
Online Access:http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2009/963717
Description
Summary:This study discusses how to adjust “monetary budget” to meet each user's physical power demand, or balance all individual utilities in a competitive “spectrum market” of a communication system. In the market, multiple users share a common frequency or tone band and each of them uses the budget to purchase its own transmit power spectra (taking others as given) in maximizing its Shannon utility or pay-off function that includes the effect of interferences. A market equilibrium is a budget allocation, price spectrum, and tone power distribution that independently and simultaneously maximizes each user's utility. The equilibrium conditions of the market are formulated and analyzed, and the existence of an equilibrium is proved. Computational results and comparisons between the competitive equilibrium and Nash equilibrium solutions are also presented, which show that the competitive market equilibrium solution often provides more efficient power distribution.
ISSN:1687-6172
1687-6180