The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games
It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We establish a general theorem that deals with monotonic rationality no...
Main Authors: | Jonathan A. Zvesper, Krzysztof R. Apt |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2010-10-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/4/381/ |
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