Reputation-based conditional interaction supports cooperation in well-mixed prisoner's dilemmas.
In the well-mixed prisoner's dilemma game, individuals are typically assumed to have no choice about whether to interact with other individuals in the population. In this paper, we instead consider reputation-based conditional interaction and its consequences for the evolution of cooperation. E...
Main Authors: | Xiaojie Chen, Alana Schick, Michael Doebeli, Alistair Blachford, Long Wang |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2012-01-01
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Series: | PLoS ONE |
Online Access: | http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3355160?pdf=render |
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