The Content and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience

The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Elisabetta Sacchi
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Firenze University Press 2016-11-01
Series:Phenomenology and Mind
Subjects:
Online Access:https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7115
Description
Summary:The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience in terms of representational content runs the risk of providing either an inadequate phenomenological account or an inadequate account of the content of the experience.
ISSN:2280-7853
2239-4028