Stochastic games for power grid coordinated defence against coordinated attacks

Stochastic games for power grid coordinated defence against coordinated attacks

As the worst-case interacting false data to the power system state estimation (SE), cyber data attacks can avoid being filtered out by most bad data detectors. In this study, coordinated attacks (unobservable attack and logic bomb attack) and coordinated defences (honeypot and weakening vision) are...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Xiaomeng Feng, Qiuye Sun
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Wiley 2020-04-01
Series:IET Cyber-Physical Systems
Subjects:
power system security
stochastic games
power grids
power system state estimation
computer network security
learning (artificial intelligence)
cyber-physical systems
power engineering computing
cyber data attacks
bad data detectors
unobservable attack
logic bomb attack
zero-sum stochastic game
cyber-physical power system
stochastic game model
isolated attacks
coordinated attacks
optimal coordinated defences
false data
attack-and-defence actions
power grid coordinated defence
nash equilibrium
minimax q-learning algorithm
equilibrium strategies
ieee 14-bus system
Online Access:https://digital-library.theiet.org/content/journals/10.1049/iet-cps.2020.0002

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https://digital-library.theiet.org/content/journals/10.1049/iet-cps.2020.0002

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