The impact of elite frames and motivated reasoning on beliefs in a global warming conspiracy: The promise and limits of trust

Given the potential attitudinal and behavioral impact of Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW) conspiracy beliefs, it is important to understand their causes and moderators. Here, two explanations for the variation in these beliefs are engaged: the first is the choice among elites to frame AGW using th...

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Main Author: Kyle L Saunders
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: SAGE Publishing 2017-07-01
Series:Research & Politics
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168017717602
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spelling doaj-e05236c25e68499bad7cdcf3bbdb15592020-11-25T03:07:36ZengSAGE PublishingResearch & Politics2053-16802017-07-01410.1177/2053168017717602The impact of elite frames and motivated reasoning on beliefs in a global warming conspiracy: The promise and limits of trustKyle L SaundersGiven the potential attitudinal and behavioral impact of Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW) conspiracy beliefs, it is important to understand their causes and moderators. Here, two explanations for the variation in these beliefs are engaged: the first is the choice among elites to frame AGW using the phrase ‘global warming’ (GW) as opposed to ‘climate change’ (CC); the second is partisan motivated reasoning. A theory is then developed about the role of trust in moderating the impact of the two frames on AGW conspiracy beliefs. In the case of CC, which is perceived as less severe than GW (and is therefore less identity threatening among Republicans), it is hypothesized that trust will moderate hoax beliefs among Republicans. In the case of GW, where the implications of existence beliefs have policy consequences that are more unpleasant, motivated reasoning will ‘win out’, and trust will not moderate conspiracy endorsement among Republicans. The results from an original question framing experiment are consistent with the author’s hypotheses. Whilst trust is a welcome commodity to those looking to persuade citizens to support AGW-ameliorating policies, it is not a cure-all, especially in the face of elite partisan cues that edify pre-existing attitudes/identities and arouse a strong desire to engage in motivated reasoning.https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168017717602
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Kyle L Saunders
spellingShingle Kyle L Saunders
The impact of elite frames and motivated reasoning on beliefs in a global warming conspiracy: The promise and limits of trust
Research & Politics
author_facet Kyle L Saunders
author_sort Kyle L Saunders
title The impact of elite frames and motivated reasoning on beliefs in a global warming conspiracy: The promise and limits of trust
title_short The impact of elite frames and motivated reasoning on beliefs in a global warming conspiracy: The promise and limits of trust
title_full The impact of elite frames and motivated reasoning on beliefs in a global warming conspiracy: The promise and limits of trust
title_fullStr The impact of elite frames and motivated reasoning on beliefs in a global warming conspiracy: The promise and limits of trust
title_full_unstemmed The impact of elite frames and motivated reasoning on beliefs in a global warming conspiracy: The promise and limits of trust
title_sort impact of elite frames and motivated reasoning on beliefs in a global warming conspiracy: the promise and limits of trust
publisher SAGE Publishing
series Research & Politics
issn 2053-1680
publishDate 2017-07-01
description Given the potential attitudinal and behavioral impact of Anthropogenic Global Warming (AGW) conspiracy beliefs, it is important to understand their causes and moderators. Here, two explanations for the variation in these beliefs are engaged: the first is the choice among elites to frame AGW using the phrase ‘global warming’ (GW) as opposed to ‘climate change’ (CC); the second is partisan motivated reasoning. A theory is then developed about the role of trust in moderating the impact of the two frames on AGW conspiracy beliefs. In the case of CC, which is perceived as less severe than GW (and is therefore less identity threatening among Republicans), it is hypothesized that trust will moderate hoax beliefs among Republicans. In the case of GW, where the implications of existence beliefs have policy consequences that are more unpleasant, motivated reasoning will ‘win out’, and trust will not moderate conspiracy endorsement among Republicans. The results from an original question framing experiment are consistent with the author’s hypotheses. Whilst trust is a welcome commodity to those looking to persuade citizens to support AGW-ameliorating policies, it is not a cure-all, especially in the face of elite partisan cues that edify pre-existing attitudes/identities and arouse a strong desire to engage in motivated reasoning.
url https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168017717602
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