Framing and Feedback in Social Dilemmas with Partners and Strangers

Framing and Feedback in Social Dilemmas with Partners and Strangers

We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Caleb A. Cox, Brock Stoddard
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2015-09-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
public goods
experiment
framing
cooperation
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/4/394
Description
Summary:We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game, players contribute to a public good, while in the Take-framed game, players take from an existing public good. The results show Take framing and Individual-level feedback lead to more extreme behavior (free-riding and full cooperation), especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability of cooperation.
ISSN:2073-4336

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