Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal concepts

Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal concepts

In recent years, a number of authors have tried to respond to Frank Jackson’s so-called “Knowledge Argument” against physicalism by appealing to phenomenal concepts, that is, concepts under which fall the phenomenal aspect of our experiences, or, to put it in different terms, concepts under which fa...

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Main Author: André Joffily Abath
Format: Article
Language:Spanish
Published: Editora Universitária Champagnat - PUCPRESS 2010-05-01
Series:Revista de Filosofia
Online Access:https://periodicos.pucpr.br/index.php/aurora/article/view/2221
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spelling doaj-df67b1a9cb3c4a8ea9e07c97136ab03c2020-11-25T03:29:25ZspaEditora Universitária Champagnat - PUCPRESSRevista de Filosofia 0104-44431980-59342010-05-012230839710.7213/rfa.v22i30.22212233Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal conceptsAndré Joffily Abath0Universidade Federal da Paraíba (UFPB)In recent years, a number of authors have tried to respond to Frank Jackson’s so-called “Knowledge Argument” against physicalism by appealing to phenomenal concepts, that is, concepts under which fall the phenomenal aspect of our experiences, or, to put it in different terms, concepts under which fall the sensations attached to our experiences. However, there is no agreement in the literature regarding the nature of phenomenal concepts. For some, these concepts are recognitional in nature. Others take them as being demonstrative in nature. In this paper, I will argue that physicalists should not take phenomenal concepts as being either recognitional or demonstrative in nature, for if they do they will not be able to respond to Jackson’s Knowledge Argument.https://periodicos.pucpr.br/index.php/aurora/article/view/2221
collection DOAJ
language Spanish
format Article
sources DOAJ
author André Joffily Abath
spellingShingle André Joffily Abath
Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal concepts
Revista de Filosofia
author_facet André Joffily Abath
author_sort André Joffily Abath
title Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal concepts
title_short Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal concepts
title_full Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal concepts
title_fullStr Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal concepts
title_full_unstemmed Physicalism and the nature of phenomenal concepts
title_sort physicalism and the nature of phenomenal concepts
publisher Editora Universitária Champagnat - PUCPRESS
series Revista de Filosofia
issn 0104-4443
1980-5934
publishDate 2010-05-01
description In recent years, a number of authors have tried to respond to Frank Jackson’s so-called “Knowledge Argument” against physicalism by appealing to phenomenal concepts, that is, concepts under which fall the phenomenal aspect of our experiences, or, to put it in different terms, concepts under which fall the sensations attached to our experiences. However, there is no agreement in the literature regarding the nature of phenomenal concepts. For some, these concepts are recognitional in nature. Others take them as being demonstrative in nature. In this paper, I will argue that physicalists should not take phenomenal concepts as being either recognitional or demonstrative in nature, for if they do they will not be able to respond to Jackson’s Knowledge Argument.
url https://periodicos.pucpr.br/index.php/aurora/article/view/2221
work_keys_str_mv AT andrejoffilyabath physicalismandthenatureofphenomenalconcepts
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