Presuppositions, provisos, and probability

Theories of presupposition in the tradition associated with Karttunen, Stalnaker and Heim relate presupposition satisfaction to the content of conversational participants’ epistemic states, usually modeled as sets of worlds. However, converging evidence from recent work on modality and from other ar...

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Main Author: Daniel Lassiter
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Linguistic Society of America 2012-05-01
Series:Semantics and Pragmatics
Subjects:
Online Access:http://semprag.org/article/view/1571
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spelling doaj-deab6d3cb07a461ca8047b9530515b1a2020-11-24T21:34:06ZengLinguistic Society of AmericaSemantics and Pragmatics1937-89122012-05-015013710.3765/sp.5.22497Presuppositions, provisos, and probabilityDaniel Lassiter0NYUTheories of presupposition in the tradition associated with Karttunen, Stalnaker and Heim relate presupposition satisfaction to the content of conversational participants’ epistemic states, usually modeled as sets of worlds. However, converging evidence from recent work on modality and from other areas of cognitive science suggests that epistemic states are better thought of as having the richer structure of probability distributions. I describe an account of semantic and pragmatic presupposition which combines core ideas from dynamic semantic treatments with a probabilistic model of information states and their dynamics in conversation, and argue that it predicts the core data of the proviso problem (Geurts 1996) without invoking ad hoc mechanisms as conditional strengthening accounts typically do. The frequently cited intuition that (ir)relevance is crucial follows without stipulation, and I present new cases which suggest that irrelevance is too weak to predict all cases of unconditional presuppositions, problematizing strengthening accounts which rely on it. The proposed theory is able to account for this new data and also for semi-conditional presuppositions, a sticking point for previous theories of presupposition projection. I argue that this perspective also gives us a reasonable line on several related issues, including the divergence between presupposed conditionals and conditional presuppositions, instances of the proviso problem in counterfactuals, and the contextual variation in the difficulty of accommodation. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.5.2 <a href="http://semantics-online.org/sp-bib/lassiter-2012-article.bib">BibTeX info</a>http://semprag.org/article/view/1571Presupposition, proviso problem, conditionals, probability, Bayesian pragmatics
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author Daniel Lassiter
spellingShingle Daniel Lassiter
Presuppositions, provisos, and probability
Semantics and Pragmatics
Presupposition, proviso problem, conditionals, probability, Bayesian pragmatics
author_facet Daniel Lassiter
author_sort Daniel Lassiter
title Presuppositions, provisos, and probability
title_short Presuppositions, provisos, and probability
title_full Presuppositions, provisos, and probability
title_fullStr Presuppositions, provisos, and probability
title_full_unstemmed Presuppositions, provisos, and probability
title_sort presuppositions, provisos, and probability
publisher Linguistic Society of America
series Semantics and Pragmatics
issn 1937-8912
publishDate 2012-05-01
description Theories of presupposition in the tradition associated with Karttunen, Stalnaker and Heim relate presupposition satisfaction to the content of conversational participants’ epistemic states, usually modeled as sets of worlds. However, converging evidence from recent work on modality and from other areas of cognitive science suggests that epistemic states are better thought of as having the richer structure of probability distributions. I describe an account of semantic and pragmatic presupposition which combines core ideas from dynamic semantic treatments with a probabilistic model of information states and their dynamics in conversation, and argue that it predicts the core data of the proviso problem (Geurts 1996) without invoking ad hoc mechanisms as conditional strengthening accounts typically do. The frequently cited intuition that (ir)relevance is crucial follows without stipulation, and I present new cases which suggest that irrelevance is too weak to predict all cases of unconditional presuppositions, problematizing strengthening accounts which rely on it. The proposed theory is able to account for this new data and also for semi-conditional presuppositions, a sticking point for previous theories of presupposition projection. I argue that this perspective also gives us a reasonable line on several related issues, including the divergence between presupposed conditionals and conditional presuppositions, instances of the proviso problem in counterfactuals, and the contextual variation in the difficulty of accommodation. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.5.2 <a href="http://semantics-online.org/sp-bib/lassiter-2012-article.bib">BibTeX info</a>
topic Presupposition, proviso problem, conditionals, probability, Bayesian pragmatics
url http://semprag.org/article/view/1571
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