The intersubjectivist conception of autonomy: Axel Honneth’s Neo-Hegelian critique of liberalism
The paper reconstructs Axel Honneth’s Neo-Hegelian critique of the classical-liberal conception of autonomy and his articulation of an alternative view of personal autonomy as the property of certain types of intersubjective relations of recognition in modernity, developed most systemati...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | deu |
Published: |
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
2017-01-01
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Series: | Filozofija i Društvo |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2017/0353-57381701074I.pdf |
Summary: | The paper reconstructs Axel Honneth’s Neo-Hegelian critique of the
classical-liberal conception of autonomy and his articulation of an
alternative view of personal autonomy as the property of certain types of
intersubjective relations of recognition in modernity, developed most
systematically in Honneth’s recent work Freedom’s Right (Das Recht der
Freiheit). The analysis of Freedom’s Right focuses on reconstructing
Honneth’s critique of the ‘negative’ and ‘reflexive’ types of freedom
(autonomy) articulated within the liberal tradition, and contrasting the
former two with the conception of ‘social freedom’ (the intersubjectivist
conception of autonomy) that Honneth formulates through a detailed ‘normative
reconstruction of modernity’. Finally, the paper considers the proximity of
Honneth’s ‘Hegelian liberalism’ to communitarianism. |
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ISSN: | 0353-5738 2334-8577 |