Grand, Bland or Somewhat Planned? Toward a Canadian Strategy for the Indo-Pacific Region

• Main Author: Patrick James
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Published: University of Calgary 2014-08-01
• Series: The School of Public Policy Publications
• Online Access: https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/indo-pacific-region-james.pdf

Canada may be a Pacific nation, but one would hardly know it, given its history of merely sporadic and inconsistent engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. The idea of a proud legacy of special relations with Asian nations is clearly overblown. Canada’s relations with the Indo-Pacific region are in need of serious attention and forethought. There is cause for concern: With the spectacular economic rise, and growing influence, of certain Asian nations, Canada’s pattern of Indo-Pacific neglect is proving increasingly unaffordable. Canada may not have squandered any significant legacy from the past, but it might easily squander the potential for crucial relations in the future. Understandably, that has led some observers to call for a sort of “grand strategy” for Canada to deal with the Indo-Pacific region: an overarching framework that would co-ordinate all the various facets — economic, institutional and security — where Canadian interests do and will touch the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, again, these calls are misplaced: Canada must be more engaged in the region, but there are instances where it should address issues on a seriatim basis (that is, confronting and responding to issues on their own, as they emerge). In some cases, a strategic framework may be prudent, but not in all cases. The appropriate approach is neither a grand strategy, nor a “muddling through” approach, but rather, something in between: partly strategically planned, partly not. In particular, it would be inadvisable for Canada to fully commit to any standing security strategy to deal with the rise of China’s military power. Canada is not a global military power, whereas its closest ally, the United States, is the world’s largest military power. The American strategy toward China will influence Canada’s approach more than any other factor, however the U.S. strategy is currently largely unclear. For Canada to be proactive in independently developing a security strategy with regard to China could result in waste and even conflict with our allies. Indeed, in evaluating Canada’s security position vis-à-vis the entire Indo-Pacific region, the factors largely seem to favour Canada taking a seriatim approach: Canada’s natural and optimal position, given its military status, is to take a reactive, second-mover approach, rather than a first-mover approach. Somewhat ironically, Canada’s history of inattentiveness towards the Indo-Pacific region may actually provide Canada with increased flexibility and advantage in the new era of rising Asian power: Put simply, save for a few examples, there is a distinct lack of baggage between Canada and the Indo-Pacific nations, leaving something close to a clean start for future relations. It is, however, critical that Canada not allow that past irresponsible practice to persist. Notions of some “grand strategy” for the Indo-Pacific region may be misguided. But given the ascendant role of Indo-Pacific nations in the 21st century, it would be even more unwise for Canada to maintain its longstanding pattern of indifference toward the region.