Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance

We contribute to the research stream emphasizing the competition between international organizations and citizens for influence over the domestic policy choices of national politicians. Drawing upon previous theoretical and empirical work on the common agency problem, we contend that the <i>jo...

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Main Authors: M. Rodwan Abouharb, David Cingranelli, Mikhail Filippov
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2019-05-01
Series:Social Sciences
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/8/5/139
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spelling doaj-dd1abe911eeb43be9010e343a94854f02020-11-25T03:05:25ZengMDPI AGSocial Sciences2076-07602019-05-018513910.3390/socsci8050139socsci8050139Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of GovernanceM. Rodwan Abouharb0David Cingranelli1Mikhail Filippov2Department of Political Science, University College of London, London WC1H 9QU, UKDepartment of Political Science, Binghamton University, SUNY, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000, USADepartment of Political Science, Binghamton University, SUNY, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000, USAWe contribute to the research stream emphasizing the competition between international organizations and citizens for influence over the domestic policy choices of national politicians. Drawing upon previous theoretical and empirical work on the common agency problem, we contend that the <i>joint</i> influence of a country&#8217;s memberships in multiple international governmental organizations (IGOs) generates consistent, unintended, disruptive effects, which reduces domestic accountability and can worsen the quality of a domestic government. Even if we assume that joining any particular IGO is beneficial for member states, the competing demands of multiple IGO memberships could undermine the quality of their governments. Our comparative, cross-national empirical findings support this theoretical expectation. Countries participating in a larger number of IGOs tend to have poorer scores on five widely used indicators of the quality of a domestic government. Future research should identify the types of policies and countries where the negative externalities of international cooperation on domestic accountability are greatest.https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/8/5/139multiple principalsinternational governmental organizationsdomestic accountabilityagency lossquality of domestic government
collection DOAJ
language English
format Article
sources DOAJ
author M. Rodwan Abouharb
David Cingranelli
Mikhail Filippov
spellingShingle M. Rodwan Abouharb
David Cingranelli
Mikhail Filippov
Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance
Social Sciences
multiple principals
international governmental organizations
domestic accountability
agency loss
quality of domestic government
author_facet M. Rodwan Abouharb
David Cingranelli
Mikhail Filippov
author_sort M. Rodwan Abouharb
title Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance
title_short Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance
title_full Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance
title_fullStr Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance
title_full_unstemmed Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance
title_sort too many cooks: multiple international principals can spoil the quality of governance
publisher MDPI AG
series Social Sciences
issn 2076-0760
publishDate 2019-05-01
description We contribute to the research stream emphasizing the competition between international organizations and citizens for influence over the domestic policy choices of national politicians. Drawing upon previous theoretical and empirical work on the common agency problem, we contend that the <i>joint</i> influence of a country&#8217;s memberships in multiple international governmental organizations (IGOs) generates consistent, unintended, disruptive effects, which reduces domestic accountability and can worsen the quality of a domestic government. Even if we assume that joining any particular IGO is beneficial for member states, the competing demands of multiple IGO memberships could undermine the quality of their governments. Our comparative, cross-national empirical findings support this theoretical expectation. Countries participating in a larger number of IGOs tend to have poorer scores on five widely used indicators of the quality of a domestic government. Future research should identify the types of policies and countries where the negative externalities of international cooperation on domestic accountability are greatest.
topic multiple principals
international governmental organizations
domestic accountability
agency loss
quality of domestic government
url https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/8/5/139
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